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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
by the courts denying equity jurisdiction on this ground generally
boil down to an action for the value of the article stolen or its sub-
stitute. When the exact amounts stolen are unknown and when
creditors of the defendant are seeking to enforce claims against prop-
erty to which the defendant, himself, never in good conscience had
any just claim, then this remedy at law collapses. In the principal
case, for example, an accounting, which can only be had in equity,10
is necessary. Therefore the summary use of the trust device here
is to be commended.
HARRY W. MCGALLIARD.
Wills-Inheritance by Child Adopted After Execution
of Adopting Parent's Will.
The testator attached a codicil in order to make provision for an
infant adopted subsequent to the execution of the will. A techni-
cality voided the codicil, but the South Carolina Supreme Court con-
strued the statute governing adoption in connection with the statute
providing for after-born children to reopen the will and to allow the
child to take an intestate share of the estate.1
The right of an adopted child to inherit arises solely from stat-
ute,2 as no such right existed at- common law.8 Subject to certain
qualifications 4 the adoption statutes make the obligations of the parent
to the adopted child the same as would be owed if the child had been
born to the adopting parents in lawful wedlock. 5 The adopted child
may inherit as a natural child where the foster parent dies intestate. 6
The North Carolina statute expressly prohibits the adopted child
" Fur & Wool Trading Co. v. Fox, 245 N. Y. 215, 156 N. E. 670 (1927) ;
note (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 654 (discussion of general problem of thieves as
constructive trustees).
'Fishburne v. Fishburne, 172 S. E. 426 (S. C. 1934).
2In re Rieman's Estate, 123 Kan. 718, 256 Pac. 1004 (1927); Elmer v.
Wellbrook, 110 N. J. Eq. 15, 158 Atl. 760 (1932).
'Villier v. Watson, 168 Ky. 631, 182 S. W. 869 (1916); In re Powell's
Estate, 112 .Misc. Rep. 74, 183 N. Y. Supp. 939 (1920); Smith v. Bradford,
51 R. I. 289, 1S4 Al: 272 (1931).
'For example there is a provision in Ill. and Ohio that the adopted child
cannot take property limited to the heirs of the parent's body or from the col-
lateral heirs of the parent [ILL REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1929) c. 4 §5; Ouio GEN.
CODE (Page, 1931) §10512(19)] while there is a provision in Va. that the
relatives of the adopted child cannot take his share of the estate if he pre-
deceases the foster parent [VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1930) §5333].
'Flannigan v. Howard, 200 Ill. 396, 65 N. E. 782 (1902) ; Bilderbach v.
Clark, 106 Kan. 737, 189 Pac. 977 (1920) ; Kales, Rights of Adopted Children
(1914) 9 ILL. L. REv. 149.
'Fosburg v. Rogers, 114 Mo. 122, 21 S. W. 82 (1893) ; In re Pepin's Estate,
53 Mont. 240, 163 Pac. 104 (1917).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
from sharing in the estate unless the parent dies intestate7 or unless
the will provides for him. A statute in Alabama was construed to
have the same effect.8
If the child is adopted after the execution of the parent's will,
does his right to inherit as a natural child serve to include him within
the statutes providing for children "born" after the making of their
parent's will? These statutes seem to be of two types. The first
provides that a child boin after the execution of his parent's will
shares as if the parent had died intestate.9 Following the view that
the adopted child has all the rights of a natural child, the majority of
the decisions under such statutes have allowed the child adopted after
the will was executed to take a child's "intestate" share. 10 The
North Carolina statute is of this type, but it does not apply to
adopted children because of the peculiar provision of the adoption
statute set out above."- The second type of statute provides that
the birth of a child after the execution of the parent's will voids or
revokes it.1 2 Some courts permit adoption to substitute for birth as
an agency of revocation 13 and the will being thus eliminated the
adopted child takes his share in the estate under the intestate suc-
cession laws. Other courts, however, deny that adoption has such
an effect under these statutes, and hold that the child adopted after
the will was made can take no share unless he can find some other
means of disposing of the instrument. 14 The liberal or conservative
7 N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §185.
' Russell v. Russell, 84 Ala. 48, 3 So. 900 (1888).
1 Some thirty-four states have this type of statute. For example: N. Y.
DEc. EsT. LAw (1909) §26; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §4169.
0 Hopkins v. Gifford, 309 Ill. 363, 141 N. E. 178 (1923) ; Dreyer v. Schrick,
105 Kan. 495, 185 Pac. 30 (1919) ; In re Rendell's Estate, 244 Mich. 197, 221
N. W. 116 (1928) ; Bourne v. Dorney, 184 App. Div. 476, 171 N. Y. Supp. 264
(1918) ; In re Sandon's Will, 123 Wis. 603, 101 N. W. 1089 (1905). Contra:
Shaver v. Nash, 181 Ark. 1112, 29 S. W. (2d) 298 (1930) (construing the
Texas statute) ; Evans v. Evans, 186 S. W. 815 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
1Supra note 7; Sorrell v. Sorrell, 193 N. C. 439, 137 S. E. 306 (1927).
'This type of statute is found in four states. For example: GA. CODE
ANN. (Michie, 1926) §3923; LA. CIv. CODE (Dart, 1932) §1705. There is a
third type of statute which provides that if a child is living when the will is
made and another is subsequently born, the latter shares as if the parent had
died intestate, but if no child is living when the will is made the subsequent
birth of the issue revokes the will. Some five states have this type of statute.
For example: N. J. CoMnP. STAT. (1910) 5865; TEx. REv. Civ. CODE (Vernon,
1925) art. 8292 and art. 8293.
1Hilpire v. Claude, 109 Iowa 159, 80 N. W. 332 (1899) ; In re Alter's Will,
92 N. J. Eq. 415, 112 Atl. 483 (1921) ; Surman v. Surman, 22 Ohio 472, 153
N. E. 873 (1925).
14 Davis v. Fogle, 124 Ind. 41, 23 N. E. 860 (1890); Succession of Mc-
Racken, 162 La. 443, 110 So. 645 (1926); In re Boyd's Estate, 270 Pa. 504,
113 Atl. 691 (1921).
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nature of the court is the determining factor, since, basically, the
statutes are similar. In several states this problem of construction
has been removed by the enactment of statutes which expressly pro-
vide for the child who is adopted after the foster parent has made
his will. 15
The principal case seems to be directly in line with the majority
of the decisions involving similar statutes (first type).16 Since
adoption is a statutory creation, it seems illogical that the adopted
child should fit into any group in which the legislature has not placed
him. However, the difficulty of the adopted child's qualification as
an after-born child is removed when the statute designating the rights
of adopted children is construed with the after-born child statute.
The relationship of natural birth established by the former statute
serves to confer upon the adopted child the privilege granted to nat-
ural children by the latter statute. Such a decision is eminently just.
It protects the interests of the adopted child while working no in-
justice upon the other heirs.
N. A. TOWNSEND, JR.
'CoNN. GEN. STAT. (1930) §4880; Onio GEN. CODE (Page, 1931)§10504-49; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, §273.
6Supra note 10.
